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Abstract
This article proposes a new holistic framework for tackling supply-side proliferation, based on a
mix of punishments, incentives, and new normative standards (PIN) that could be taken by
industry. After outlining a brief history of illicit nuclear trade, highlighting the increasingly
sophisticated strategies adopted by proliferators, we explore in detail the PIN framework. We
argue that to meet this challenge, industry must adopt behavior that goes beyond compliance with
current regulations, particularly in the area of due diligence and information sharing.

I.

Introduction

Since the dawn of the atomic age, the spread of nuclear weapons and their associated delivery
systems has been at the forefront of the international security agenda. Originally perceived as a
state-level issue, the exposure of the A.Q. Khan procurement network in 2004 vividly highlighted
the role that non-state actors, the private sector, and in particular dual-use industries can play in
facilitating nuclear proliferation. Here there have been multiple examples where states lacking
indigenous resources or expertise have sought to obtain materials and equipment from the global
marketplace in order to advance weapons programs. In response to this challenge, the
international community has developed a system of supply-side controls, aimed at restricting the
transnational movement of such goods. While these state-enforced measures have, arguably,
served to slow the rate of proliferation, they are far from watertight, with their provisions varying
from country to country and with determined actors employing ever more elaborate schemes to
circumvent them.
As a consequence, attention has turned to whether the private sector could play a more proactive
role in helping curb proliferation activities. This article aims to contribute to this discussion by
outlining a new holistic framework of punitive actions, incentives, and new normative standards
(PIN) for industry engagement in non-proliferation efforts, drawing on interviews with
practitioners, theories of corporate social responsibility, and lessons from other industries
After providing a brief history of illicit nuclear trade, intended to highlight evolving challenges to
the export control regime, we will explore in detail the proposed PIN framework. Here we will
argue that in order to tackle increasingly sophisticated proliferation efforts, firms must adopt
measures for due diligence and information sharing that go further than what is required under
existing national legislation. This beyond-compliance behavior, currently exhibited by only a
small number of firms, should be promulgated across relevant industries. Here a bottom-up
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approach is likely to be most effective, in which industry champions and other relevant bodies
promote the non-proliferation benefits of “beyond compliance” in tandem with its economic
advantages.

II.

A brief history of illicit nuclear trade and export
controls

International efforts to reduce the risk of imported nuclear materials and technologies being used
in weapons programs can be traced back to the establishment in 1971 of the Zangger Committee,
a small group of states tasked with exploring the implementation of Article III.2 of the recently
ratified Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which had entered into force in 1970. In 1974 the
Zangger Committee published the first “trigger” list of sensitive materials and equipment, whose
export to nuclear weapons states not party to the NPT would require the application of IAEA
safeguards [1]. That same year, India conducted its first nuclear weapons tests, using plutonium
diverted from a Canadian-supplied research reactor, dramatically demonstrating how imported
civil nuclear technology could be misused [2]. In reaction to this, the most prominent nuclear
supplier states came together to form the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an informal body
focused on reducing proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of nuclear materials
and technologies, who published their first guidelines in 1978 [3]. Similar in spirit to the Zangger
Committee, the NSG crucially included a number of states that – at the time – were non-NPT
member states and required the application of controls on transfers to all non-nuclear weapons
states, including parties to the NPT.
Broader in scope than the Zangger Committee, the NSG was not without weaknesses. Focusing
initially on nuclear-specific items, its guidelines did not cover “dual-use” materials and
technologies that, although not necessarily directly nuclear-relevant could be used in a weapons
program. This gap was recognized by proliferators, with states seeking nuclear weapons now
trying to buy nuclear-related technologies piecemeal – targeting dual-use items that were not
addressed by the NPT or NSG at the time, and whose ultimate use was ambiguous. In the case of
South Africa, materials and technology sourced from multiple states were used to produce seven
nuclear weapons in the 1980s, which were ultimately dismantled [4]. However, it was the
discovery of a covert nuclear weapons program in Iraq in the early 1990s, which used imported
technology, that galvanized international action. In an effort to close this gap, the NSG developed
and published in 1992 a new list of guidelines for the transfer of dual-use materials, equipment,
software, and other technologies [5].
The NSG, while it has adapted somewhat to a changing security environment, remains hamstrung
by its status as a voluntary group, with states retaining the ultimate say in how its guidelines and
control lists are implemented within their national laws. For example, evidence suggests that
export control measures vary significantly from state to state in terms of punitive actions,
enforcement, and level of regulation [6][7]. This enables proliferators to selectively choose
procurement targets and pathways where they are less likely to get caught. Furthermore, while
NSG control lists are typically updated every few years to take into account technological
progress, proliferators have sought to target materials and equipment before they appear on the
lists, and also to seek those sub-threshold items with properties that fall just outside of
documented specifications. These weaknesses were highlighted by the activities of A.Q. Khan, an
eminent scientist within Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. In the 1990s and 2000s, Khan
established an international black market through which states—including Libya, Iran, and North
Korea—bought a wide range of nuclear technology [2]. These were sourced from multiple
companies, operating in more than ten states, with Khan using a system of front companies and
transhipment hubs to obscure the ultimate destination of the various items.[2] The extent of this
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black market became apparent in the early 2000s, culminating in Khan’s 2004 confession to
selling nuclear secrets to the three aforementioned states [2][8].
In the wake of the exposure of Khan’s network — and a post-9/11 increase in fears of nuclear
terrorism — the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 [9] in April 2004.
This resolution, which focuses on minimizing the potential role that non-state actors are able to
play in WMD proliferation, calls on “all States to take additional effective measures to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery”[9]. In
contrast to the NSG and the other WMD-related multilateral export control regimes, such as the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Australia Group, UNSCR 1540, passed under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, is legally binding. Consequently it requires, alongside other
security measures, that governments put in place appropriate border, export, and transhipment
controls. This universality was a crucial step in putting the international export control regime on
a more formal and—hopefully with time—a more level footing, although the implementation of
1540 remains hindered due to a number of factors, primarily because there is no mechanism for
gauging and ensuring states’ compliance. While legally binding, the mandate of the 1540
Committee, established to oversee the Resolution’s implementation, is weak. It contains no
provisions for verification or for enforcement. Instead, the Committee has to rely on voluntary
self-reporting by states, which is often conducted inconsistently.

III. Export control challenges: Widening gaps and
sophisticated procurement strategies
Although UNSCR 1540 requires that states put export controls in place, and other initiatives such
as the NSG have helped improve harmonization across states, national regulations, control lists,
licensing criteria, and enforcement activities remain far from uniform. As was the case during the
time of A.Q. Khan’s network, proliferators continue seeking to exploit weak points in this web,
trying to get items directly from, or to tranship them through, states with weaker export controls,
where they are less likely to get caught [10]. Unfortunately, the vulnerability posed by these gaps
is liable to increase in the near future due to the ever-growing internationalization of supply
chains and the wider availability of dual-use goods. At present, developed nuclear states with
relatively strong export controls harbor the bulk of higher-quality nuclear and missile-related
manufacturing capabilities. However, this situation is changing as manufacturing sectors in
developing countries grow and increase in sophistication [11]. A prime concern here is the
explosion of the dual-use manufacturing sector in China, increasingly capable of manufacturing
commodities, which were previously the preserve of the state-owned enterprise. UNSCR 1540
recognizes this challenge, calling on well-resourced states to assist others—although deference to
state sovereignty means that this is provided only to those that ask for it.
Proliferators have also tried to get around export control regimes by targeting non-listed items,
for which export control obligations are far less straightforward. In order to combat this, states
have put in place systems of end-use controls, requiring firms to contact the relevant export
licensing organization if they know or suspect that their export would be used in a WMD program
(NSG 1). Although this is a logical step in tackling an undefined set of potentially relevant items,
to be effective it requires that industry be able to distinguish a proliferation-related activity from a
legitimate request. This is especially necessary when considering goods that fall below the control
threshold, but could be of use in a weapons program. In this situation, companies are not obliged
to apply for an export license if they do not believe the goods are destined for a WMD program,
meaning that government authorities are not always afforded the opportunity to assess the risk of
the license application. Distinguishing these suspicious enquiries from bonafide trade is a far
from simple task, with evidence suggesting that proliferators are becoming increasingly deceptive
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in their procurement efforts, making it harder to identify such actions. Consider for example the
recent case of Chinese proliferator Li Fang Wei, who dealt in dual use missile-related goods, and
who is believed to have used at least 13 company names and eight aliases in his procurement
efforts [12].

IV. Efforts to engage industry
With international action in this area limited by state sovereignty, and with proliferators adopting
sophisticated procurement strategies that are challenging to identify even by complying with the
most robust of national export controls, it is necessary to consider what additional measures could
be undertaken by industry to combat this threat. Studies in this area can be traced back to the
early 1990s, in reaction to the unveiling of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program [13]. The need for
industry engagement is also captured by UNSCR 1540, which requires states to “develop
appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding the obligations”[14].
Industry outreach has been taken up in the context of UNSCR 1540 via the so-called Wiesbaden
process, which in 2012 held the first international industry-focused conference on the resolution’s
implementation [15]. Other sub-regional events targeted at different sectors have followed this,
initiated by countries including the US, Japan, Germany, and the UK [16]. While in 2013, the
NSG published a code of good practice for industry outlining eight non-proliferation-related
internal actions that firms could employ [17].
These international, regional, and national activities have served to improve awareness within
industry of proliferation issues, although studies indicate that there is still considerable work to be
done, particularly in engaging small medium enterprises (SMEs) [18]. A study by the UK’s
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills [19] of more than 500 industry firms found that the
general understanding of export controls was significantly lower within SMEs than within larger
firms [19]. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the majority of these smaller firms are not active
members of major trade associations, through which non-proliferation guidelines and events are
propagated [20, 21]. Efforts are further complicated by a lack of understanding about what
categories of firms in different sectors manufacture dual-use items. Mapping the dual-use
industry would enable more targeted outreach, which at present can be implemented only at the
sector level.

V.

A holistic PIN framework for tackling supply-side
proliferation

Studies into combating supply-side proliferation have tended to focus on individual initiatives or
particular approaches, but without considering them in combination. But we must consider a
range of strategies and their linkages, and discuss how it is necessary to employ them together in
order to shift firms’ behavior in this area towards ownership of non-proliferation. Here it is
instructive to consider the “ladder of involvement” developed by Roper et al. for categorizing the
engagement of employees in security programs [22]. This ladder has “rungs” of behavior, which
from bottom to top are: subversion; avoidance; apathy; compliance; participation; and ownership.
In this formulation, compliance can be reached through top-down measures including a
combination of punishments and incentives, provided in this context by national authorities.
However, to reach participation and ultimately ownership, it is necessary to consider how best to
grow, within industry itself, broader normative standards—which go beyond what is required
under national legislation.
In exploring how firms might climb Roper’s ladder to reach ownership of supply-side
proliferation, we use concepts from theories of corporate social responsibility (CSR), stakeholder
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engagement, and industry regulation. Because self-regulation approaches to supply-side
proliferation are still at their early stages of implementation, we draw parallels with initiatives in
other sectors in order to demonstrate how these might apply in practice.
Punitive actions to ensure compliance
When exploring punishments that can serve to influence behavior it is important to include both
“formal” and “informal” penalties, the former of which might include fines or imprisonment
levied by states, and the latter reputational damage. In the commercial context, these must be
considered alongside other relevant drivers, in particular the desire to maximize profits. The
effects of these on the decision-making calculus of firms would constitute a cost-benefit
conception of compliance drivers.
Most countries have export control legislation in place that authorizes the application of punitive
measures against non-compliant firms. Some of these approaches to potential punitive measures
are more stringent than others. The US implements by far the most severe penalties, and has in
the past fined companies millions of dollars for felonies related to export control [23]. The US
has also imposed significant financial penalty on non-US companies through extra-territorial
sanctions, which prevent firms from accessing US markets. In other countries— such as the
UK—penalties are seen less frequently and when they occur are of much lower severity.
However, in broad terms, and across the world, it would appear that the scope of these measures
is far from well understood within the commercial sector (besides those firms already subject to
penalties), particularly by small medium enterprises (SMEs). Relevant trade industries and
government departments have undertaken some scoping work in this area, which in turn has
served to highlight the extent of this problem. In a 2013 survey carried out by ADS Group—a
leading trade association for the UK’s aerospace, defense, security, and space sectors—
responders from SMEs clearly indicated that they did not appreciate the costs of non-compliance
with export control. In the previously cited BIS study, more than half the surveyed firms claimed
that the key barrier to understanding dual-use controls was a perceived lack of relevance [19].
Other accounts indicate that firms have tended to consider export control issues only
retrospectively, once an incident had occurred [21, 24].
Consequently, there is a need to more widely publicize export controls issues with a particular
focus on formal punishments levied on non-compliant firms and on the wider informal costs.
Here there are a number of case studies that could be used. One such high-profile example is
Oerlikon Leybold, a German supplier of dual-use vacuum machinery, whose technology was
found by IAEA inspectors at Iraq’s nuclear sites in the early 1990s. As a consequence, Leybold
suffered massive reputation damage and the loss of major contracts in both Japan and the US [4].
It is also important that punishments be perceived as credible—i.e. they will be enforced—and
severe enough to deter non-compliance. Otherwise a firm may understand what the law states, but
may believe that they will get away with not adhering to it, or after carrying out a cost-benefit
analysis may decide, for example, that it would be cheaper to pay a small fine for first-time
noncompliance than to establish an internal compliance program. Here studies focused on the UK
have indicated that firms themselves perceive the penalties for non-compliance as too low [19].
Other evidence suggests that serious punishments such as imprisonment are not regularly
enforced [11]. On the flip side of the coin, costs of running compliance programs for SMEs may
run into the thousands of pounds per year and result in lost business through rejection of
suspicious orders [25].
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Consequently, there is a general need for stronger, more costly punitive measures and their
greater enforcement. It is also important that these be applied proportionally, based on the nature
of the offence and the behavior of the firm in question. To use Roper et al.’s ladder: we must
punish offending members of industry proportionally, based upon whether they are subversive,
avoidant, or apathetic. Fines, confiscation of assets, and loss of export privileges could be
employed to tackle negligence-driven non-compliance, while imprisonment might serve to deter
firms thinking about bypassing export controls. These penalties should also contain an element of
flexibility, with leniency displayed to firms that voluntarily disclose instances of non-compliance.
Incentives used to encourage ownership
While punishments can change behavior, studies across a range of fields have shown that in
isolation they are at best likely to achieve mere compliance [22]. To encourage participation and
ownership, it is necessary also to consider incentives as part of a broader carrot-and-stick
strategy. As was the case with punishments, these can be either formal or informal in nature,
ranging from “performance-conditioned obligations” to reputational benefits [26]. To date,
relatively little consideration has been given to incentives, both by governments and industry,
with most firms viewing export controls as a hoop that must be jumped through—and compliance
an activity that will likely stunt business growth and profit as opposed to one that could have
wider beneficial effects. That said, there are a small number of cases where firms have identified
clear financial benefits resulting from their non-proliferation efforts.
In terms of formal approaches, export licensing is one area where incentives could be offered.
Here the Wassenaar Arrangement in its 2011 “Best Practice Guidelines on Internal Compliance
Programs for Dual-Use Goods and Technologies” have suggested that states should consider
taking into account a firm’s internal compliance programs when adjudicating export licenses,
potentially making it a requirement for receiving a general license [27]. This is the case in France,
where national legislation includes codified criteria for effective internal compliance programs
against which firms are judged when applying for a license [28]. Related approaches might
include a simplification and speeding up of the licensing process for firms judged to have
effective internal compliance systems. This type of approach has been used in other sectors, for
example in healthcare, where under the US Occupational Health and Safety Administration’s
(OSHA) Voluntary Protection Program (VPP), practices judged to maintain lower-than-average
injury and illness rates have their OSHA inspections reduced [29]. However, streamlined
procedures such as these bring with them the inherent risk that it may become easier for firms to
cheat the system, making it essential that national authorities retain their ability to detect and
punish incidences of non-compliance in such a setup.
The informal benefits of adhering to export controls have also been recognized by an increasing
number of companies that have experienced increased trade and revenue as a result of their
growing reputation in this area. According to Strong, firms with robust compliance programs
often receive more orders, and can increase their prices to cover the costs of a compliance system
because many customers are willing to pay more in exchange for the guarantee of a quick
turnaround, trusting that their order won’t be detained due to non-compliance with regulations
[24]. That said, these benefits are likely to become significant only in the mid- to long-term and
may result in a business downturn in the short term. In the case of Westcon Group, a
multinational telecommunications distributor, the implementation of a new export control system
at first resulted in the cancelling of millions of pounds worth of orders [30]. However, the new
customers attracted as a result of the firm’s increased reputation in this area gradually offset this.
Over the past six years since its compliance program was implemented, the Westcon Group
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estimates that it has attracted significantly more new business than it has had to turn away due to
export control concerns [30].
Beyond Compliance Behavior
With proliferators becoming increasingly deceptive in their efforts to acquire technology relevant
to nuclear weapons, it is necessary to consider what additional steps firms might take to combat
this threat, above what is currently required under national regulations. Kurzrok and Hund
suggest seven possible options including: corporate governance statements; participation in an
industry-wide code of conduct; preferential choosing of business partners; sharing suspicious
trade requests; participating in government export control rulemaking; non-proliferation training
for employees; and acknowledging incidences of noncompliance [31]. In what follows, we
explore the potential benefits of some of these approaches with a focus on the utility of due
diligence and information sharing.
In performing due diligence on potential transactions, industry must be on the alert for a range of
warning signs that might indicate a suspicious order [32]. These can be related to customer, enduse, or destination and may include the following: a customer declines routine installation,
maintenance and training; the product’s capabilities and order size does not match its stated enduse; or the destination is a major transhipment hub. A combination of these and other indicators
should trigger a further investigation to establish the legitimacy of a particular order, through the
use of open sources or other means [33]. Due diligence processes can be enhanced through
establishing an internal database of suspicious enquires, enabling firms to analyze historical
trends and establish whether a particular order might be part of a broader proliferation strategy.
Rakon UK, a UK subsidiary of a New Zealand-owned electronics firm, manufactures frequency
control products, e.g. quartz crystal oscillators, which can be applied in both GPS systems and for
missile guidance. It has carried out due diligence checks for nearly a decade. Following an
incident in 2005 where a Rakon product was believed to have been diverted from Switzerland to
Iran’s ballistic missile program, the company decided to establish a system for identifying red
flags and storing information regarding possible suspicious orders [33]. Rakon’s efforts include
training for staff on export control regulations as well as on past cases of suspicious enquiries and
how they have been identified. Potential customers are checked against national entity lists and
vetted using open-source methods. Thanks to these processes, Rakon UK identified and rejected
about 30 suspicious enquiries from 2005 to 2011 [34].
The power of due diligence can be significantly enhanced through wider sharing of information.
Here firms could pass data on suspicious enquiries to their competitors, supply-chains, and
national governments. This would help establish a more comprehensive understanding of the
proliferation threat, with analysts able to draw on information from multiple firms. Sharing of
security-relevant data between companies is carried out in other industries—for example, in
banking, where UK firms pass on incidences of fraud through the Fraud Intelligence Sharing
System (FISS) [35]. When it comes to sharing procurement data, this can be as simple as
forwarding an email inquiry. Unfortunately, at present this is not commonly done by the dual-use
industry, with firms typically discarding information on an order they deem too suspicious to fill
[12]. This can be partly attributed to a perceived risk that sharing such information would
associate firms with illicit procurement, making them more likely to be investigated and
potentially prosecuted for non-compliance [36]. In order to alleviate this barrier, a third-party
facilitator, comparable to the FISS, could act to sanitize this information before it is shared with
other companies and the authorities [12]. The importance of sharing information related to due
diligence has been recognised by the NSG, who published a set of corporate guidelines for dual-
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use exporters in 2013 [17]. These encourage firms to establish internal compliance systems
incorporating due diligence and vetting, sharing information with relevant state authorities and
with their supply chain.
New normative standards
The above sections have attempted to illustrate some of the steps that can be taken to combat
supply-side proliferation, drawing on a small number of firms’ existing actions in this area and
highlighting the importance of beyond-compliance actions. Given the variation in national export
controls, and the propensity of proliferators to target the weak points in the international system,
these measures will be effective only if widely promulgated across the dual-use industry. At
present it seems that levels of adoption are low, particularly among SMEs, where there may be
little if any awareness of proliferation issues. Consequently, this section will consider how a nonproliferation norm of behavior might be developed within the dual-use community.
According to theories of corporate social responsibility (CSR), firms frequently take voluntary
measures, which go beyond their legal obligations, superseding their immediate economic
interests. These might be due to a mix of ethical, philanthropic, or other reasons, with actions
strengthened if the firms also expect longer-term economic gain [37][38]. In the proliferation
context, it is clear that some large firms are already exhibiting CSR, having embraced supply-side
control issues, perceiving it to be part of their role as a responsible stakeholder and a mechanism
to grow business in the longer term. However, for others, in particular SMEs, the situation is less
clear. This is not surprising, as studies have shown that while CSR can strongly influence the
behavior of large firms, its effect is not as significant in decision making of SMEs. For example,
in a 2005 survey of Danish SMEs, only just over a third believed CSR had a positive impact
[39][40].
Consequently, it would seem that the onus is on larger firms to develop industry-wide standards,
by encouraging or even requiring involvement from their supply-chain partners as a condition of
doing business. This approach has proven effective in other industries. For example, in 1990 the
three major tuna canners demanded that their suppliers adopt dolphin-safe technology, measures
which have been linked to a significant drop in dolphin mortality [41]. In the proliferation
context, this approach has been suggested by Bhandarkar and Alvarez-Rivero, who encourage
multinational corporations (MNCs) to take the lead in encouraging CSR in supply chains,
recommending that MNCs should assess the specific needs of their suppliers and offer training
and other support accordingly [40].
Civil society can also play an important role in establishing new normative standards in this area.
Appropriate actions include monitoring, assessing, and publicizing firms’ activities relevant to
non-proliferation. This is already done in the area of nuclear safety by the Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations, which ranks power plants on their performance and shares these with the
public as a means of motivating managers to adhere to relevant standards [40]. Civil society can
also help facilitate the sharing of best practice and information, offer training and expertise, and
undertake awareness-raising efforts [42]. Here Gunningham and Rees argue that “a commitment
to dialogue, persuasion and cooperative problem solving” is likely the most effective strategy for
fostering CSR, provided that it is a lack of capability to understand and follow the norms—and
not subversiveness—that underlies unsatisfactory performance [43]. As has been acknowledged
in the literature and at the 2012 Wiesbaden Conference, firms, especially smaller ones, struggle
significantly with a lack of resources when it comes to proliferation issues. An example of a
cooperative approach for civil society is Project Alpha, a UK-government-funded, universitybased group, that provides openly available compliance guidance and threat briefs on its website
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[44]. Alpha also runs sector-specific seminars on export control compliance. Additionally, the
project has created a “Partners Against Proliferation” initiative, in which firms that have
committed to implement a compliance program receive access to training and other resources.

VI. Conclusions and future work
This paper has argued that supply-side controls enforced by states alone are insufficient to
counter nuclear proliferation, and it has suggested a range of actions that industry might take to
help close this gap. Weaknesses in the current export control regime stem from the uneven
national implementation of UNSCR 1540 and other relevant guidance. This is compounded by
the dynamic nature of illicit procurement, with proliferators adopting ever-more-sophisticated
strategies to circumvent existing measures. In order to combat this, the private sector will need to
take actions that go beyond what is required under existing national regulations, including due
diligence and the sharing of this information within their communities. Although this is already
happening to some extent, much more effort in this area is required. Large multi-national
companies should take the lead, supporting SMEs and propagating best practices for nonproliferation throughout their supply chains. Civil society also has a role to play. It should
publicize firms’ actions (and inactions) in this area, provide expert guidance and training, and
carry out broader activities to raise awareness of the risks posed by supply-side proliferation.
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